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A COMPLEX(ITY) STRATEGY FOR
BREAKING THE LOGJAM
BETH

S. NOVECK• AND DAVID R. JOHNSON••

In this essay, we explore how the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) might use technology to improve the agency's level
of scientific expertise and to obtain useful information sooner to
inform EPA policymaking.
By creating a self-reinforcing
collaboration between government and networked publics, new
web-based tools could help produce change within government
and without-namely governmental decisions informed by better
data obtained through citizen participation and civic. action
coordinated with governmental priorities. The agency has the
opportunity to help break the logjam of environmental
policymaking by developing transparent and participatory
mechanisms for expert citizen participation. The key insight is not
to throw open the floodgates to undifferentiated public input, but
to design group-based processes that enable online communities to
collaborate on finding and vetting information for agencies.
After expanding on our core argument and addressing initial
counter-arguments, we briefly discuss the current state of public
participation. We then discuss the potential for technology to
create more effective collaboration by uniting experts from
multiple disciplines and both the public and private spheres. To
illustrate how technology can facilitate collaboration between
agency and public, we use the Peer-to-Patent pilot program,
recently adopted by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. We. conclude by discussing innovative ways that EPA
• Beth Simone Noveck is Professor of Law and Director, Institute for
Information Law & Policy, New York Law School. She is the Founder of Peerto-Patent (http://www.peertopatent.org). Portions of this article are based on her
forthcoming book, Wild Government: How Technology Can Make Government
Better, Democracy Stronger, and Citizens More Powerfal (Brookings Press,
forthcoming 2009). She can be reached at noveck@gmail.com.
•• David R. Johnson is Visiting .Professor of Law, New York Law School,
and Founder, Virtual Company Project (http://dotank.nyls.edu). He is formerly a
Partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in Washington, DC. He can be reached at
davidr.johnson@verizon.net.
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could integrate similar methods into its decision-making processes·.
I. A

COMPLEX APPROACH

Extending the intelligence of governmental institutions by
connecting them to networks of collaborating groups provides the
prospect for evolving appropriately complex solutions to the
world's increasingly challenging environmental problems. As
Hayek pointed out, centralized planning is prone to failure due to
the inability to aggregate distributed knowledge. 1 Rather than
asking simply how the law can be amended to improve the
environment (or how government or corporations should work),
we can focus on how we can catalyze the rich social processes that
allow both centralized governmental institutions and large
numbers of people to work together to improve our environmental
condition.
Individuals considered in isolation, perhaps participating oneon-one in voting or in markets, have little ability to spur
environmental improvements. Though new pricing schemes might
change incentives, individual members of the public lack sufficient
inforination and power to affect broad change. They usually act
according to self-interest and overgraze the commons. Thus, we
tend to be skeptical about the value of changing our light bulbs or
reducing the air in our tires when juxtaposed against a sweeping
international treaty even when such treaties are slow in coming and
easily countermanded.
But decentralized, individual action is not the only alternative.
Connecting individuals to institutions through networks helps to
produce large-scale social change. We think better when we think
together. Collaboration yields better information and we should
want government to make the best-informed decisions possible.
But collaboration also enables individuals to become more
effective. The more effective we can become as individuals by
participating in communities of governance, the more powerful we
can become as citizens participating in the life of our democracy. 2
1
See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 34 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 519-20 (1945). Though Hayek focused on the economic implications
of disaggregated knowledge, his contention also applies to the law.
2
"When done well, public participation improves the quality and legitimacy
of a decision and builds the capacity of all involved to engage in the policy
process. It can lead to better results in terms of environmental quality and other
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In addition to changing outmoded laws, we should also strive to
create new social organizations that bring government institutions
and the public together to collaborate on setting environmental
priorities and affecting widespread change.
Congress has failed to pass a major piece of environmental
legislation since 1990. As the organizers of the Breaking the
Logjam symposium note: "The result is that many environmental
problems remain unresolved: the oceans have become increasingly
degraded and their fish stocks depleted, urban sprawl and traffic
congestion threaten our ecosystems, and factory farms contaminate
the environment in many parts of the country. And the U.S. has
been unable to successfully deal with many new environmental
problems, most prominently climate change."3 This volume's
reformist call-to-arms-consonant with a growing body of legal
scholarship about regulatory and institutional pluralism4-also
imagines that new ways of working are necessary, such as
developing approaches that cut across regulatory silos and using
market mechanisms as leverage, such as in congestion pricing
strategies.
But this vision assumes the unchanging permanence of the
design of government institutions. In particular, it assumes that the
administrative state must continue to be the expert decision-maker,
rather than envisioning the state as a coordinator of actions by a
wider array of participants. At the very least, traditional reform
approaches, even ones that attempt to be cross-institutional, fail to
envision a role for greater citizen participation in decision-making.
The new science of complex systems 5 suggests that people
social objectives. It also can enhance trust and understanding among parties."
COMM. ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DECISION
MAKING 9-3 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stem eds., 2008), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/ 12434 .html.
3
BREAKING THE LOGJAM: AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, BACKGROUND OF THE BREAKING THE LOGJAM PROJECT,
http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/conferences/btl/background.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2008).
4
See, e.g., Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. R.Ev.
1155 (2007).
5
This is a vast new field of scientific inquiry, spurred by collaborative work
at the Santa Fe Institute and applicable to biological, economic and social
systems. Many in the environmental area will find this familiar. Outlining the
substance of this science is obviously beyond the scope of this article, but we
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could become a key component of any solution to environmental
problems when organized together in groups (online) and when
coordinating their actions with those of others (most importantly
including government). This is because social organisms have the
ability to repair themselves and replicate; they evolve when
interactions reach a critical level of complexity. Through social
interaction-when specific roles and tasks are well-defined to
enable collaboration-groups of people can better achieve their
goals. Rethinking environmental policy demands becoming better
at creating the conditions under which group power flourishes.
Complex systems science teaches us that organisms (indeed,
life itself) flourish(es) at a "sweet spot" between randomness and
rigidity. That is to say, the complex flow of signals among
autonomous agents becomes richer and more diverse . when
ambient conditions allow just enough flexibility to adapt to new
challenges and just enough order to allow the persistence and
replication necessary to enable evolution to operate. For more
complex social systems, this means that the primary goals of any
governmental effort should be to ( 1) recognize whether relevant
social subsystems have moved too far towards the random or rigid
side of the continuum (as they do when we become constrained by
outmoded environmental legislation and regulation) and (2)
intervene to nudge these systems back towards the sweet spot in
the middle, opening it up to new signals and interactions.
We believe that one answer to our environmental challenges
is to be found in enabling people acting together in groups to
accomplish goals they conceive to be in furtherance of an
environmental improvement. Want to clean up a local park?
Enlist the neighbors. Want to shut down a polluting company?
Enlist the customers. Want to encourage everyone to use less
energy? Enlist a movement of people who will spread the word
about the benefits of energy conservation. Want to find out what
level of protection is appropriate for certain areas of the sea?

include in the body of the article the main points we think are relevant for
planning new approaches to governmental (and public) action to solve
environmental problems. See· generally THE BIOLOGY OF BUSINESS: DECODING
THE NATURAL LAWS OF ENTERPRISE (John Clippinger ed., 1999); JOHN
HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1996);
STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
SELECTION IN EVOLUTION (1993).
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Enlist an army of volunteers to collect and study the relevant data.
Make a movie. Make a movement. Do not just' write laws. Do
not just complain to those who do.
II. CHANGING NATURE OF EXPERTISE

Before we move to addressing concrete examples of how EPA
might beneficially adapt to networks, we must first unpack two
ideas-and thereby address two counter-arguments-implicit in
this discussion of collaboration and complexity. First, in this
section, we address the myth that government knows best. This
applies whether we are talking about Congress or agencies,
government at the federal, state, or local levels. In the next
section, we address how networked publics are in any way
different from the corporations, interest groups, and other
organizations that currently populate the Beltway ecosystem and
participate in policy-making.
In a democracy, citizens typically rely on a professional elite
to make specific administrative decisions in the public interest.
Governmental professionals decide on acceptable levels of
mercury emissions in the air, anti-discrimination rules in education
and the workplace, and the standards for cross-ownership of .
newspapers and broadcasting stations.
The notion that government officials can deal in a limited
amount of time with complex information regarding the global
economy is a myth. Poor decision-making leads to grave
consequences for jobs, the economy, education, healthcare, and
every issue of importance. Even in the absence of personally
corrupt motives (and independent of political value preferences),
the bureaucrat in Washington often lacks access to the right
information or to the expertise necessary to make sense of a welter
of available information. In a survey of environmental lawyers,
for example, only 8 percent of respondents strongly agreed that the
EPA has sufficient time to search for relevant science before
making_ a decision about environmental policy and only 6 percent
strongly believed that agencies employed adequate analysis in their
In the United States Patent Office, the
decision-making. 6
examiner, who is tasked with deciding which invention will
6

J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006).
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receive a twenty-year grant of monopoly rights,_ has little more
than a dozen hours in which to do all the research and write up a
decision.
A handful of professionals in a government agency is unlikely
to possess as much information as the many dispersed individuals
in the field. Indeed, in the 2006 IBM Global CEO Study, when
asked where they looked for fresh ideas, corporate chief executives
cited clients, business partners, and employees far more than their
own research and development labs. 7 This supports the popular
adage: No matter who you are, most of the smartest people work
for someone else. Known as Joy's Law (for Bill Joy, the cofounder of Sun Microsystems), this quip pinpoints the core
challenge faced by all organizations in an exploding information
ecosystem, where most knowledge is outside the boundaries of the
institution, including govemment. 8 In today's age of networks,
Joy's Law implies opportunity through shared resources, not the
problem of limited resources.
Empirical work demonstrates that people are more effective
when they work together as a group. As Stephen Kosslyn, Chair
of the Harvard Department of Psychology and head of the Harvard
"Group Brain" project explains, working together allows us to
utilize many different tools. Because we "simply [do not] have
enough genes to program the brain fully in advance," we must
extend 'our own intelligence with what he terms social prosthetic
systems. 9 At the most basic level, we need to pool our diverse
knowledge and skills. Even institutions need prosthetic extensions
to make themselves smarter and.more effective. We can use the
Internet to assemble more capable teams, drawing on expertise
across disciplines and the public/private divide.
Similarly, dividing a policy problem into smaller parts so that
collaborative teams can work on it facilitates openness and
innovation. This openness may not just help government do its job
7
Press Release, IBM, Majority of Global CEOs Plan Fundamental Change
and Expect New Forms oflnnovation to Drive Growth (Mar. l, 2006), available
at http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/ 19289. wss.
8
Karim R. Lakhani & Jill A. Panetta, The Principles of Distributed
Innovation, 2 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 97, (2007),
available at http://www.mitpressjoumals.org/doi/pdf/l O. l l 62/itgg.2007.2.3.97.
9
Stephen M. Kosslyn, On the Evolution of Human Motivation: The Role of
Social Prosthetic Systems, in EVOLUTIONARY COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 541,
543 (S.M. Platek, T.K. Shackelford & J.P. Keenan eds., 2006).
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better; it can introduce the problem to more people, allowing
competition for solutions to emerge. Impelled by a government
mandate, the private sector and civil society might suggest their
own solutions. If we use netWork technologies to construct the
architecture of participation, we can elicit more valuable
contributions from citizens. But making this happen requires some
coordination. That is where state institutions can still play a vital
role.
We already have an architecture of policy-making that
involves a wide array of actors. Corporations participate through
lobbyists and notice-and-comment rulemaking. Non-governmental
organizations funnel information to government through thinktanks and their whitepapers and publications. Interest groups also
lobby and enlist their members to respond-usually with postcards
and email-in rulemaking and legislative policymaking. With so
many groups already involved, it is not clear how online,
networked groups are different. It is also not clear what will
prevent new, networked publics from becoming as entrenched as
the lobbying culture that contributed to the logjam in the first
place.
Inviting more public participation is not simply a
duplication of current notice and comment processes or a recipe
for a different form of lobbying. If we create the right practices,
we create structures to reward participation and encourage highquality contributions, hard work, and good behavior, even as we
create disincentives for manipulation and abuse.
First, giving ordinary people-as distinct from corporations
and interest groups-the right and ability to participate enables
them to form new groups better suited to address new problems.
Alone, there is not much any one person can do to bring about
change or to participate meaningfully and usefully in a
policymaking process. But, working together, a group can take
action at scale. Additionally, the network structure allows groups
to remain sufficiently adaptable, so that group action can
continuously adjust to address the most pressing problems. Online
groups can change their collective goals more quickly than can
traditional organizations that hire full time employees and lock-in
around their own institutional and individual priorities.
Second, workirig in networked groups that convene people of
diverse skills and shared enthusiasm expands the range of ways in
which people can participate. The practice of using technology to
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make information gathering a more collaborative part of policymaking, not only by making more people aware of a problem but
also by pulling more people into the work of government, begins
to take the bureaucracy out of bureaucracy. It can augment the
official's social toolbox with the capacities and skills of nongovernmental experts.
Third, by opening up the decision-making process to group
participation, we may begin to create feedback loops that go
beyond mere data-gathering and, instead, create communities of
collaborative action that engage even more people m
environmental reform.
III. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION TODAY
At present, engaging with the public does not always produce
good results.
Traditional forms of notice-and-comment
rulemaking solicit expertise too late in the process after draft
regulations are already a fait accompli. 10 The participation in
response to notice-and-comment rulemaking suffers from
problems of quality. Critics complain of a range of defects, from
regulatory capture--excessive influence of regulators by those
stakeholders whom they regulate-to excessive participation by
individuals who carp but offer little information to inform the
process. 11 Because the playing field is biased towards legal and
interest group professionals, it is often only interested parties
"inside the Beltway" who provide information to the agency. 12 At
the same time, potential participants overburden the regulator with
"postcard comments," written and duplicated by an interest group
without offering any new information to the decision-maker. 13
While science advisory boards and peer review (and science
review panels) help to introduce expert information into agency
practices, these methodologies have limitations. At first glance, it
would seem that peer review is a fairly conservative means to
attack the information quality problem and provide much needed ·
oversight and accountability. But the biases of participants chosen
10

Beth Simone NJlveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53
L.J. 433, 454 (2004).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 479-80.

EMORY
11

12
13
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for peer review inevitably skew the process. There is no assurance
of transparency in participant selection. Peer review notoriously
produces a buddy system in which insiders reward friends and
punish enemies. And the high cost of having to select peers and
administer review means that people can only wind the machinery
into gear on limited occasions.
By empanelling peers, rather than allowing them to selfselect, the agency misses out on relevant sources of expertise.
Typically, decision-makers invite only certain kinds of industry
and academic experts to participate in peer review processes.
Those limitations need not be based on politics-though a political
litmus test is sometimes imposed (as has often been the case in the
Bush Administration)-but may also be based on profession and
thereby foreclose disciplinary diversity. Or the practices might
derive from status and thereby shut out otherwise qualified
participants with meaningful contributions. There are those who
possess a great deal of expertise but do not necessarily have the
"right" credentials. Thus, science advisory boards have limited
usefulness.
However, when agencies open regulatory processes to public
comment, agencies often are overwhelmed by comments, many of
which are unusable. The EPA received over half a million
comments in response to its Clean Air Mercury rulemaking in
2004. Only 4,500 of these were unique. 14 These postcard
comments often have more to do with interest groups mining for
data and donations from potential members than informing
policymakers.· Either rulemakings receive no response, or there is
an avalanche of identical comments. In many cases, prolix
comments arrive at the eleventh hour, hand-delivered minutes
before the deadline to thwart instant electronic access to the
comments of corporate rivals.
Some agencies have attempted to introduce technology into
the consultative process, but these have not improved decisionmaking practices as much as they inight. In the United States EGovernment Act of 2002, Congress legislated "e-rulemaking" to
put the AP A public comment process online and "improve the
14

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONTROLLING POWER PLANT EMISSIONS:
COMMENTS,
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/control_emissions/
comment.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).

PUBLIC
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quality and use of Federal information to strengthen
decisionmaking". 15 While thirty agencies were already using the
Web to put notice of rulemaking activity on the Internet and make
relevant documents available in electronic form, e-rulemaking
consolidated activity and spending (and therefore power) around
one, centralized website under the control of the Office of
Management and Budget. 16 But the digitization of citizen
participation practices has not worked well. The Regulations.gov
website merely lists a draft rule and provides a box and a button to
"click here for comment." The web has made it easier for
machines or "bots," rather than people, to send electronic
comments via the website, further deluging the agencies with
unusable information. The FCC received hundreds of thousands of
comments in response to its proposed rule weakening the standards
for cross-ownership of broadcasting outlets. 17 Online participation
is evolving from notice-and-comment into "notice and spam." 18
The design of the electronic process, as distinct from the
traditional, paper-based form of participation, does not encourage
better-informed participation or greater representation of those
who are not participating in the process. While e-commenting
makes the opportunity to comment more accessible, employees do
not organize nor sort the blizzard of comments on regulations.gov
by any meaningful search criteria. Comments are not deliberative;
they do not respond to one another but are one-off communiques
between submitter and agency. When the Forest Service ran a
controversial rulemaking in 2000 to make one-third of the lands
under the National Park Service's control free from road
construction, it allowed people to submit comments online but .did
not allow submitters to see one another's comments. 19
With so many comments, commentators as well as agency
officials do not have the resources to consider the merits of each
and formulate considered replies. In some agencies, the review of
15
16

E-Government Act of2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501(4) (2000).
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Aug. 15,

2008).
17
Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 954, 956--57 (2006).
18
Noveck, supra note 13, at 441.
19
Stuart Shulman et al., Electronic Rulemaking: A Public Participation
Research Agenda for the Social Sciences, 21 Soc. SCI. COMPUTER REv. 162,
163-64 (2003).
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comments has to be outsourced. In a study of Regulations.gov in
2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office found that the website
did not generate a steadier stream of useable comments. 20 As
University of Pennsylvania rulemaking scholar Cary Coglianese
notes, the introduction of online commenting "has not had any
substantial impact on public participation in rulemaking."21
Perhaps surprisingly, the advent of e-commenting has increased
paper-based submissions as some believe that taking up space on
the regulator's desk will increase the likelihood of being heard.
IV. TECHNOLOGY'S POTENTIAL IMPACT

Technology has the potential to greatly improve public
contributions to regulatory decision-making. A technological turn
toward networked, collaborative governance would enable us now
to work in groups across distance and institutional boundaries.
Technology can reinforce the sense of working as a group by recreating some of the conditions of face-to-face work environments
that build trust and belonging even without the benefit of physical
proximity.
Sixty million people use the Firefox Browser. Ten thousand
of them participate in building and testing it. By asking a
community to help fix bugs in the software and rewrite the code,
the organization begins to rely more and more on its community.
As the community comes to be more involved, control becomes
dispersed. Everyone in the network has an influence. What begins
as a set of practices for information gathering may result in
feedback loops that, in turn, create communities of collaborative
action and engage even more people.
Similarly, if we start to think about taking a policy problem
and dividing it up into smaller parts so that it can be distributed
and worked on by collaborative teams, we begin to drive towards
openness and innovation. And this is why inviting more public
participation is not simply a recipe for a different form of
lobbying. As in the Mozilla context, if we create the right

°

2

Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, 1
I/S: J.L. & PoL'Y INFO. Soc'y 33, 52 (2005); Coglianese, supra note 17, at 95455. The study was conducted shortly after the site's creation but even a year
after its creation, the site had not generated significantly more comments.
21
Coglianese, supra note 17, at 954.
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practices, we can evolve norms and structures to reward
participation and encourage high-quality contributions, hard work,
and good behavior, even as we create disincentives for
manipulation and abuse.
V. FROM DECISION-MAKER TO COORDINATOR:
ASKING GRANULAR QUESTIONS

"Crowdsourcing will not create any genuinely new things,"
unless people know what is being asked of them. 22 Wikipedia
users know what to do because they understand what it means to
write a "neutral viewpoint" entry to an encyclopedia. People share
a common image of that collective go~l. Few people have a strong
preconception about how best to participate in governmental
decision-making. Thus, it is essential to articulate the questions, a
task that is just as hard for those asking as for those answering.
The online collaborative endeavor that produced the Linux
operating system took off because Linus Torvalds, then just a
teenager living in Finland and not yet the leader of a world
movement in Silicon Valley, asked for help porting the Minux
how-to-make-an-operating-system teaching tool to his own
computer. 23 His very specific question galvanized the contributing
community.
Ask a hard, specific question and you will get a good, specific
answer. A granular question will attract a larger potential pool of
self-selected solvers.
Getting governmental authorities to
communicate their needs to citizens so that people understand
what is being asked of th.em is vital to ensuring that environmental
activists can supply information to government in manageable and
useful ways.
What does this mean in practice? Imagine if, in connection
with every notice-and-comment .rulemaking, an agency had to
articulate ten questions to which it needed responses in .order to
draft the final rule. Or, better yet, what if it asked these questions
22
Video recording: Jay Rosen, The Future of Professionally Created
Content, Address at the Legal Futures Conference, Stanford Law School (Mar. 8,
2008)
available
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/calendar/details/1594/
#related_information_and_recordings.
23
ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR (2000),
available
at
http://gnuwin.epfl.ch/articles/en/cathedralbazaar/cathedralbazaar.pdf.
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before the drafting process begins. Technology can make it
possible to disseminate specific questions and gather useful
responses in every domain.
It may seem simplistic to propose this as a core innovation
because its absence from the practices of public policymaking is
profound. We are suggesting that government ask relevant and
useful questions of more audiences. Because of our entrenched
culture of expertise, believing that institutional actors are in the
best position to make decisions in the public interest, agencies
rarely ask the public for more than an opinion on pending
regulation.
Asking questions specifically not only helps to identify the
tasks that need to be done but provides the rationale to the
participating contributors for doing them. If people are to give of
their limited time, they need to know the context for their
involvement. Framing the question. is important to ensuring that
work that is being asked of them is not mere "make work" nor
unduly broad in scope (i.e., solve the climate change crisis)
because in most cases it will not be paid labor. People need to be
able to accomplish something working in short bursts of online
collaboration.
Certain kinds of decisions lend themselves to aggregating
answers across a network. Sometimes those are questions that
require brute numbers of participants. This aggregation may be
automated. The SETI@Home project is an experiment that uses
Internet-connected computers in the Search for Extraterrestrial
Intelligence (SETI). Networking software allows people to break
large projects into discrete units that multiple users or computers
can complete, combining small efforts of thousands to complete
large, complex and time-consuming tasks. The SETI@home
project24 links hundreds of thousands of computers together to
share their excess processing power, allowing researchers to search
for extraterrestrial life among millions of images.
Other projects, rather than just use surplus processing power,
harness individuals' brainpower.
The NASA Clickworkers
project, rather than just use surplus computing power, trains
individuals with no prior scientific background to classify the age
of craters and landforms on Mars from images taken by various
24

SETI@HOME, http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
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spacecraft. 25 NASA combined the volunteers' contributions to
create a map of the ages of different regions of Mars.
Networks can also allow thousands of users to contribute and
aggregate their own information. Photosynth lets large numbers of
people take pictures and assembles their work whether for citizen
science or other goals, including documenting geographic spaces
and communities. 26 Mapufacture27 enables collaborative map
building. Mapufacture lets people build maps and data sets on
their own or by building off of publicly available geospatial
documents, assisting a "non-profit that wants to share information
·about an area you're helping--or a relief worker who wants to
make it easier for people in the field to get the information that is
useful to them when and where they need it. " 28 It is a small step
from this to asking citizens to provide GIS locations for
environmental hazards or to crowdsource data about clean air or
water in their communities.
More complex collaborations are also possible.
Some
questions require more than a yes/no or multiple choice answer.
An organization may need to identify but not aggregate a large
number of answers across a network. Many problems lend
themselves to different solutions. This "wiki-style" approach to
collecting information engages people in identifying the pieces to
solve a complex problem. Where there is no one right answer, this
approach can help in forming a strategy and setting regulatory
priorities.
Networking technology also makes prediction markets
possible. Prediction markets take advantage of new technology to
automate the aggregation of discrete votes from people. 29 James
25

Michael Szpir, Clickworkers on Mars, 90 AM. SCIENTIST 226 (2002).
MICROSOFT LIVE LABS, Photosynth, http://labs.Iive.com/photosynth/ (last
visited Aug. 15, 2008).
27
MAPUFACTURE, http://mapufacture.com/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
2s Id.
29
Some examples of prediction markets are Simon and Schuster's new
MediaPredict project, which encourages readers to guess which manuscripts will
become best-sellers, MEDIAPREDICT, http://mediapredict.com (last visited Aug.
15, 2008); the Iowa Electronic Markets, which have been successful at guessing
the results of presidential elections, UNIVERSITY OF lowA COLLEGE OF BUSINESS,
IOWA ELECTRONIC MARKETS, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem (last visited Aug.
15, 2008); and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, which does remarkably well at
predicting Oscar winners, HOLLYWOOD STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.hsx.com
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
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Surowiecki's The Wisdom of Crowds has popularized the idea that
people can use technology to create aggregated predictions that are
more accurate than those of any individual. 30 Such "prediction
markets" are empirically good at reducing uncertainty and can be
useful for identifying "big mistakes."31 Business is increasingly
turning to online predictive mechanisms to aggregate private
information to inform decision-making. Unlike traditional voting
or polling, such "markets" require the participant to back up his
guess with a bet, usually using fake currency or points. A tool site
called "Kluster" allows users to set up projects and then to "invest
in" those projects. 32 In other words, it makes it possible to bet on a
project's likely success and thereby establish a futures market to
drive good ideas. These probabilistic mechanisms are not always
accurate and we are still learning when they work, but they are one
way of aggregating discrete answers to inform a decision.
In addition to questions to which there is an answer that
people can arrive at by prediction or those which require
aggregating information, there are those questions for which the
pieces of the answers are already identified but demand evaluating,
drawing connections, and making sense of conflicting
information. Again, new technology can be useful at enabling
distributed networks to collaborate on data analysis and evaluation.
VI. PEER-TO-PATENT
By way of example, the Peer-to-Patent: Community Patent
Review pilot (www.peertopatent.org) is a new architecture of
participation. 33 This first experiment with web-based collaboration
30

JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS {2004).
See CASS SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE (2006); see also KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL, AEl-BROOKINGS JOINT
CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, STATEMENT ON PREDICTION MARKETS (2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=984584. Its authors define prediction
markets as "markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of
an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election." Id. at 1.
32
Bob Tedeschi, Putting Innovation in the Hands of a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/technology/03ecom.html?
_r= I &scp= 1&sq=kluster&st=cse&oref=slogin.
33
For background on Peer-to-Patent, see PEER-TO-PATENT PROJECT:
COMMUNITY PATENT REVIEW, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent (last
visited Aug. 15, 2008). See also Beth Simone Noveck, Peer To Patent:
Collective Intelligence, Open Review, And Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. &
TECH.123 (2006).
31
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between a government institution and a community of participating
volunteers online links the United States Patent and Trademark
Office to an open network of scientific/technical experts.
Launched in June 2007, the Peer-to-Patent program solicits
public participation in the patent examination process via the Web
at http://www.peertopatent.org. As part of the process by which
the patent examiner determines whether the patent applicant has
met the legal standards set forth by the Patent Act,. the Peer-toPatent program, serving as an adjunct to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), frames questions so as to solicit only
that information which is relevant to the pending patent
application, and invites the public to respond. Because responding
to the questions requires enthusiasm and expertise, participants are
self-selecting. Because the questions are honed and targeted, the
public submits information that is useful to the agency. Public
citizens research the pending patent application, uploading relevant
publications for use by the patent examiner. The public does not
take over the substantive work of the official patent examiner, but
augments it by collectively compiling pertinent citations to prior
art. As a result, the public plays a significant role in the patent
decision-making process.
On a small scale, Peer-to-Patent has empirically demonstrated
the inadequacy of prior assumptions about the need to centralize
all aspects of administrative decision-making. In this Patent Office
experiment, non-governmental actors provide informationserious, expert, fact-based, experiential, scientific informationthat government can use to enhance its decision-making. In its
first year, the Peer-to-Patent pilot showed that the public is in
possession of useful information not available to the patent
examiner and, despite the complexity of the patent examination
process, will take the time to contribute the information. Amateurs
possess extraordinary expertise. The non-governmental public
includes "experts" in a variety of fields, including scientific,
economic, mathematical, and other relevant areas who can help
produce and vet information in the decision-making process in a
timely fashion.
Government officials would do their jobs more effectively if
they could access better information through collaboration with
those able to supply it. For example, in 2007 Congress mandated
and the President signed a switchover to new, energy-efficient
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light bulbs and instructed the EPA to implement the law into
regulations. 34 The agency, however, did not have a plan in place
for disposing of the 300 million mercury-containing fluorescents
sold each year in the U.S. Understandably, given the demands of
global climate change and the challenges of election year lame
duck politics, the agency was too busy to have light bulbs on its
radar screen. But without imposing any significant additional
costs, the. agency could have set up a simple, online platform
whereby a network of concerned citizens, in coordination with the
EPA, could have identified this problem and possible solutions.
Had the agency articulated the question well, not only would it
have received coordinated responses but private sector companies
might also have stepped up to offer mercury reclamation
programs; foundations might have funded prizes to social
entrepreneurs who devised effective solutions.
Or, take another example (which we will discuss in greater
detail). Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has to draft an Air Quality
Criteria Document, setting forth a preliminary assessment of air
quality prior to setting standards. 35 Instead of turning to a dozen
agency-selected experts for help, it could consult a network of selfselected as well as invited online advisors. In developing its
assessment, the EPA could put relevant queries to the scientific
community. Experts can invite other experts. The consultation
can take place both early in the process and, again, once the
document is drafted.
Law professors Josh Eagle, James N. Sanchirico, and Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., participants in Breaking the Logjam, suggest
that the oceans be zoned to mitigate problems of overfishing,
damage to marine habitats, accidental mortality of non-fished
34

Claudia H. Deutsch, No Joke, Bulb Change Is Challenge for U.S., N.Y.
Dec.
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at
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Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2000).
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species, and other challenges to the health of our seas. In this plan,
commercial fisheries, recreational fishermen, conservationists, and
other stakeholder groups would assume responsibility for different
ocean zones. Now imagine that we apply a collaborative approach
to this interesting proposal as well.· A federal agency such as the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration might usefully
set up a process and online platform for each of these stakeholder
groups to develop policy, solicit information and feedback, and
thereby take responsibility for managing its zone of the ocean in an
informed, open, and expert fashion.
VII.

Two PRACTICAL INNOVATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICYMAKING: CIVIC JURIES AND POLICY WII<IS

One example of citizen collaboration is the Danish Consensus
Conference, a type of small-group "citizen jury" that the Danes
convene to vet policymaking relating to complex scientific and
technological issues. 36 The Danish Board of Technology is an
independent body that advises the Danish Parliament about science
and technology issues like food quality and human health, IT
security, and free public transport. The Board uses a variety of
deliberative methodologies, including the Consensus Conference
methodology to give parliament a. sense of public opinion on
difficult, scientific policy issues. The method involves convening
a focus group of about sixteen people from among interested
members of the general public. Sometimes the group meets for
two days at a time over several weeks; at other times the meeting
lasts for five days.
The citizen group reads background
information and receives presentations from a panel of
professional experts. At the end of the meeting, the participants
develop conclusions, which are published and distributed to the
Danish parliament. The Danish Consensus Conference method is
used to analyze broad, complicated, and contentious social issues
such as cloning and abortion.
When the Danish model was conceived, these juries had to
meet face-to-face. As with other citizen consultation practices, the
juries are largely discursive and not connected to day-to-day
36

TEKNOLOGI-RADET (DANISH BOARD OF TECHNOLOGY), THE CONSENSUS
CONFERENCE,
. http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=468&toppic=

kategori12&1anguage=uk (last visited Aug. 20, 2008).
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policymaking.
But the Danish model does have some
consequences in that these small groups write position papers on
policy that are directly channeled to parliament. In addition, the
Danish Technology Board has a great deal of experience that
demonstrates that the small-group consultative model operates
well.
Methods similar to those of the Danish Consensus Conference
might easily be transposed for more active policymaking activities
and scaled using the Internet. For example, instead of convening
the jury to write position papers as in the Danish model, we can
create such a small group jury to create greater accountability in
policymaking by having the juries oversee the work of appointed
officials. Each Assistant Administrator at EPA, for example, for
air and radiation, solid waste and water, and each of the regional
administrators would have a jury assigned to track his or her
actions over the jury's term.
The environment is clearly a hot button issue. Ordinary
citizens are yearning for a way to have an impact upon and some
input into the environmental crisis. While these would be
relatively easy to organize small group exercises, such juries
would resonate beyond the few dozen or few hundred people who
serve. The mere existence of an avenue for engagement, even by a
small number of "us," creates an impetus for openness.
Unlike Federal Advisory Committees, which are closed-door
in nature, the convening of such civic juries could be automated
and transparent. Juries might be selected at random from a pool of
self-selecting volunteers. · Other approaches might be tried. EPA
might convene multiple civic juries and assign them to oversee its
officials' work. Civic jury participants could be drawn from a mix
of volunteers, who work in environmental industries and research
and others who come from diverse perspectives but have an
interest in the topic. Potential members would specify their
profession and their interests in response to a web-based
questionnaire, making it easier for the software platform to
convene and communicate with such civic jury communities
automatically. Or, members might be chosen at random from
among the most active participants in a policy wiki community or
from among those who participate in rulemaking activities.
Civic juries would meet online and serve limited terms to
ensure that members are not overburdened or entrenched. A jury
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(or more than one) could be assigned to oversee the work of a.
political official. Volunteers (who might be paid as in traditional
jury service) would log in regularly to read a private blog where
the official discloses his actions to the jury. The jury could ask
questions, request clarification, challenge the official's actions but,
in every case, the existence of the jury would demand that the
official articulate reasons why a particular action was taken. The
official would be required by enabling statute or regulation to ask
for the jury's recommendation. Failure to follow a consensus
recommendation would trigger a legal requirement on the part of
the civil servant to justify the decision. That departure from the
group's recommendation would be a matter of public record.
This innovation is but one variation on the jury-model that
could enable ordinary people to exert influence at the national
level while informing policy and improving governmental practice.
Collaborative editing technologies, known as wikis (of which
Wikipedia is the most famous example), now make it possible for
a distributed team of individuals to craft a document together. An ·
online group can consult about the science involved in setting the
air quality standard, but it can also help EPA to draft the Air
Quality Criteria Document. Rather ·than invite participants to
comment on an already drafted document or regulation after~the
fact, experiments in crafting pronouncements collaboratively
should be tried sooner and with a wider audience. Again, such
experiments should eschew closed-door, individual practices that
create problems in traditional consultative methodologies in favor
of new ways of technologically-enabled working that allow people
to self-select to participate on the basis of expertise and
enthusiasm. As in Peer-to-Patent, such a process need not cede
agency responsibility to the public but can augment its access to
good information.
Some government authorities have caught the "wiki bug" and,
often at the behest of consultants, created internal shared drafting
platforms. But not every participant could or should put pen to
paper (or to pixel) in the document. Good drafting requires so
much more than good writing; there are numerous roles for people
to assume. Hence a "policy wiki" should not simply be a way for
everyone to write together. The agency should identify the roles
that need to be played and construct the space for managing those
roles and the resulting project. In other words, this would be a
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website where the goal, such as drafting the Air Quality Criteria
Document, is described and broken down into specific tasks that
small groups of people can undertake.
If the ways of getting involved are well delineated (and that's
something participants can also help to do), there are roles for
experts and non-experts, scientists, and enthusiasts, alike. Besides
the writing, such work might involve:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Inviting experts and other participants to join the network
Researching the claims in the document (or draft regulation)
and identifying environmental impact
Commenting on and editing particular provisions
Vetting, evaluating, and rating the comments of others
· Summarizing and translating texts into plain English
Analyzing positions of stakeholders and interested parties
Creating visualizations (diagrams, charts, and illustrations)
to reflect and represent the draft
Identifying abuses, inaccuracies, and corruption, when such
problems arise
Moderating discussions
Promoting the effort to other weblogs and websites, helping
to get the word out, and prompting grassroots mobilization
Putting an electronic "bumper sticker"-an icon or buttonon one's own website to show support for and encourage
others to get involved in the effort (the Mozilla Foundation
encourages its users to post a Firefox button as a way to
encourage others to download the software)

The software could do the work of showing people in an air
quality drafting committee the roles and tasks they have taken on
and the rules of engagement via the computer screen. By showing
the group back to itself and making its goals and tasks intelligible,
the computer screen can help to strengthen· the group's sense of
common purpose. The agency should post all the relevant data
sets in usable formats so that members of the network can then use
readily available data manipulation and visualization tool (Swivel
or Many Eyes being two examples of such software), to make
sense of and comment on that data.
If an agency builds an open, transparent, meaningful
framework, participants will come. Keep in mind EPA does not
need one hundred thousand people to join a policy wiki committee
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on the issue of lead in the air. A few thousand part1c1pants
working a few hours each helped the USPTO find information it
did not otherwise have. Environmental activists, academics,
corporate professionals, students, and environmental enthusiastsmore than just the usual corporate and interest group playerswith useful knowledge to share will then have a way to contribute
and get involved. The network will help to do the work of
managing the process and evaluating submissions such that the
entire burden does not fall to overworked agency officials. If we
design the prnctices and platforms to split up tasks into many
smaller, fact-gathering and decision-making exercises, we will
have diversified against the risk of defection and corruption and
made it easier for people to participate.
Some will challenge the efficacy and limitations of such
collaborative strategies. Only a small percentage of open source
software projects get built. The SourceForge repository for open
source software collaboration is teeming with languishing
programming projects. But the idea is not to generate only one
solution. We want people to spark lots of ideas and to share in the
work of vetting them. Perhaps most importantly, spurring this
kind of engagement in the process will inevitably lead to increased
efforts by civic groups to take action directly to affect the
environment, better informed by understanding what government
can and cannot do itself.
This reciprocal interplay between institution and network is
not limited to the federal level. Community groups and a mayor's
office could work together-enabled by software-to propose,
organize, and execute local greening and environmental clean-up
projects. Obviously, such a project has to be driven by the real
needs and demands of actual communities.
Such a local project could exploit the latest web-based
technology to allocate tasks and roles both to citizens and to the
city, assigning sweep-up to volunteer participants while assigning
the job of installing new locks on the gates of the park to the city.
Photosynth, a new photo-documentation technology from
Microsoft, might enable people to track· visually the progress of
such projects over time.
Photosynth software assembles
photographs of the same location taken by disparate people with
different cameras and from different angles into a single picture,
allowing many people to participate in the work of documentation.
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By moving from experiments about technology's impact on
collaboration in the lab to work designing the mechanics of real
institutions and networks, we might create new opportunities for
civic engagement and improve upon the citizen participation
practices of the pre-Internet era. The goal is to enhance mutual
accountability between government and citizens.
CONCLUSION

The loci for innovation in social organizations no longer lies
only with governmental institutions or markets but also with online
networked communities. One potentially effective way to improve
the environment is to enlist the efforts of ordinary people, acting
together to help government make better decisions and to help
each other to accomplish environmental goals. The goal should
not be to increase lobbying or complaining. We need to make it
possible for more people to do more effective work in groups.
The environment is a complex system and environmental
policy making must reflect this complexity. No one-not even the
most talented governmentally funded scientist--can be sufficiently
expert to make decisions about the world environment. It is
simply not a matter of engineering. It is a matter of evolving .
complex and adaptable systems that can interact with each other,
over time, co-evolving with the problem. And we must embrace
the trend towards increasing diversity and complexity of such
interactions.
Our strategies have to grow-have to evolve-through
experiment and trial-and-error. We cannot be afraid, merely
because we are in the traditional domain of law, to start small, see
what works and try again. Inescapably, we are gardeners, not
mechanics, and so we should think about our legal institutions as
social organisms. In this environment, we can all play many
productive roles by planting and weeding, fertilizing and building
trellises.
To those who would rely on governmental authority (or a
limited set of institutional actors) to make environmental decisions
based on the limited amount of attention individual citizens have to
give to this issue, it is worth pointing out what biologist Stewart
Kauffman terms the "fourth law of thermodynamics." He
postulates that complex systems of autonomous agents tend to
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become more complex over time because each time we add more
interacting nodes in a network, we create far more potential
interactions. 37 Precisely because we can all now spend small
amounts of time collaborating with others, via the Internet, to take
on projects to attack environmental policy goals, we should not
entrust this mission solely to the government. And it is exactly
because we all only have a limited amount of time that we need
governmental institutions to help focus our efforts.
Government exists to do the work of the people. But the
Internet enables the people to do some of their own work by acting
in groups. Governments might prefer that people use the Internet
at most to distribute information to people. If we care about the
work of improving the environment, we should want to use the
Internet to enlist more workers! Network technology opens up
possibilities for distributed communities to collaborate with
government to ensure that environmental decision-making is based
on better information, and, because of the increased engagement of
all of us, is more effective.

37

Stuart Kauffman, Investigations 2-4, 151-52 (2000); see also Eric D.
Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical
Remaking of Economics 141-59 (2006); David Warsh, Knowledge and the
Wealth of Nations: A Story of Economic Discovery (2006). The point is that
networks potentially increase the number of different ways for people to work
together and exchange knowledge-and that an increase in the diversity of
such interactions increases the number of solutions available.
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